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Abstract
In this paper, I start by describing two categories into which effort can be divided. The
first category I call objective effort, which refers to the external factors associated with an action;
the second I call subjective effort, which deals with the internal psychological or mental effort
required to bring oneself to perform an action. I then track my intuitions about how objective
effort and subjective effort are relevant to the moral evaluations of actions and agents, and
further develop this descriptive account by explaining these intuitions normatively through the
lenses of contractualism and virtue ethics. Having given my account of how effort plays a role in
ethics, I show how understanding the role of effort can change the way we look at the distinction
between doing harm and allowing harm. I do this by describing how actions and omissions can
be understood through effort, giving my account of the distinction between doing harm and
allowing harm, and then comparing my account with others’ accounts. Finally, I touch on the
distinction between intending harm and foreseeing harm to show that thinking about effort is
relevant not only to the particular example of the dialogue surrounding the distinction between
doing harm and allowing harm, but also to other discussions as well.
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It’s Always Sunny In Philadelphia is a TV sitcom about “The Gang”, a group of friends
who own a bar named Paddy’s Pub in Philadelphia. The friends are incredibly selfish and seem
to have no moral values at all, and episodes often revolve around their crooked plans like the
time two friends fake being a recovering crack addict and being mentally disabled in order to
obtain welfare. But despite the general vice and debauchery the friends are used to, in Season
10, Episode 9 (“Frank Retires”), even these friends are shocked when one of them, Dennis,
reveals one way he cheated Frank, another friend and the man who raised Dennis, out of money
for years:
“All right, look, guys, it's very simple. Seven years ago, I walked into a Wawa,
and I saw this guy and I thought, ‘Holy shit! That guy looks just like Frank, but,
you know, Mexican.’ And then I came up with a plan where I could make Frank
believe that he had a son with our maid Josefina all those years ago and I could
bilk him out of a shitload of money under the guise that the money was all going
to his firstborn son, Franquito, when, in fact, the money was going to me.”
This seems wrong.
There are, of course, many, many reasons why this plan seems wrong. We can explain
the wrongness of this plan by talking about the financial harm it caused the victim involved,
Frank. We can also reference the particular heinous nature of tricking a person about one’s
children. (Interestingly, Frank was also previously in the TV series falsely led to believe that
Dennis was his biological son.) Others of us might frame the discussion around the rights such
as the right to property that were violated. But one factor that seems to me to go ignored often in
discussions of ethical behavior is the factor that I want to focus on here (and for the remainder of
the paper) – effort. Dennis clearly put in a lot of effort into this plan, and I think this fact is
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particularly shocking to us. This is a plan that required deception that could not have been easy
to pull off, recruitment of other people (namely Franquito) that would also have taken a lot of
energy, and years and years of upkeep of this façade. All of this would have taken an incredible
amount of effort and there is something quite deplorable specifically about the effort involved
that makes this plan so much worse than your average case of fraud. But despite how much
effort Dennis would have had to put in to carry out this plan, Dennis at the same time introduces
this plan as “very simple” and tells the story in a quite casual manner. His offhand manner of
telling the story of his plan reveals to us that while Dennis was willing to put in a lot of effort to
carry out this plan, it was also, in a way, quite easy for him to carry out this hard plan. He did
not have to put in the effort that most of us would have had to expend in order to bring ourselves
to do something so horrible.
Effort itself seems to play an important role in the way we look at actions and people.
This importance of effort will be my focus throughout this paper. I begin by describing effort on
its own and then observing the way in which effort seems to affect the way in which we evaluate
an action and an agent. Next, I try to explain why effort seems to matter in the way I observe.
Having attempted to give an explanation for why effort matters, I then look at how effort matters
in other matters like the difference between an action and an omission and the difference
between doing harm and allowing harm.

Objective and Subjective Effort
It seems to me that there are two main categories of effort when we talk about the
difficulty involved in doing something. I will call the two categories objective and subjective
effort.
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Objective effort includes things like money spent, time spent planning, time spent acting,
or physical exertion – what we typically mean when we use the word effort conversationally. I
call this effort objective because it is the effort involved in doing an action that anyone with
certain relevant characteristics would have to expend in order to do that action. I specify “certain
relevant characteristics” because, while I use the word objective to point out that objective effort
holds constant across a certain group of people, it does not hold constant for absolutely everyone.
In other words, if an action required an hour of time to perform, I am calling this hour of time
objective effort not because an hour is the same for absolutely everyone including a person who
works fourteen hours a day and a person who works on their own flexible schedule; I am calling
the hour of time objective effort because if we hold certain relevant characteristics constant,
which in this case would be work and commitment schedules, we would see that an hour would
be the same for people with similar work and commitment schedules.
Now if we were to ask who spends more objective effort, a person who spends an hour of
time to do an action compared to another person with a similarly busy schedule who spends two
hours of time to do an action, the answer would be easy because they share the same relevant
characteristics: the person who spends two hours of time. But we also may have to compare the
amount of objective effort spent between people who do not share the same characteristics. For
example, we might ask whether a person who spends an hour of time to do an action expends
more objective effort or another person who is much more busy who spends an hour of time to
do an action expends more effort. In this case, even though both people spent an hour doing an
action, the busier person spends more objective effort because it requires more from the busier
person to spend an hour than it does the less busy person. In situations like this when we
compare people who do not share the same characteristics, we would have to come up with some
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sort of (rough) conversion scale to convert objective effort for one person with certain
characteristics to objective effort for another person with other characteristics. For example,
$1,000 is not the same for people who make $12,000 a year and for Tony Stark, a.k.a. Iron Man,
but we might be able to come up with some sort of progressive scale using percentage of income
and living expenses where X% of income for the $12,000-a-year group and Y% for the Tony
Starks of the world could be considered to have a similar amount of impact for both groups. A
similar strategy might be used for the other examples of objective effort I mentioned above like
physical exertion or time spent: lifting X pounds would require the same amount of objective
effort for people with a certain weight and strength training level as lifting Y pounds would
require people of another weight and strength training level, and X hours would require the same
amount of objective effort for people with a certain schedule as Y hours would require people
with another schedule. Regardless of whatever these X’s and Y’s end up being, however, the
main point to keep in mind is that when we say that someone spends more objective effort than
another person (or I say in this paper), this sort of conversion should be implicit in that
statement.1

If objective effort is that effort that holds constant across people with certain
characteristics relevant to the action, subjective effort is the effort that varies even for people
with the same relevant characteristics. Subjective effort is the psychological and mental effort
associated with an action, or how hard it is for an individual to carry out an action given a certain
amount of objective effort. For example, if my mom asked my sister and me to clean our rooms,
the objective effort involved in doing so would be roughly the same for the both of us. The size

1

Of course, I don’t want to pretend that coming up with such a conversion scale would be easy at all, but I am
merely suggesting that such a scale is conceptually possible.
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of our rooms and the spatial density of objects that need to be thrown out or organized are
roughly the same, and my sister’s characteristics and my characteristics relevant to cleaning our
rooms are the same: we are both strong enough that cleaning our rooms requires about the same
physical exertion from both of us and the time spent cleaning our rooms would have the same
impact on both of us as we are both students with similar schedules. However, the subjective
effort that my sister needed to exert in order to perform the act of cleaning her room is higher
than mine, so my room was consistently cleaner than hers, even though in terms of objective
effort, it seems like there was no reason why I seemed to clean my room more often than my
sister cleaned hers.

Distinguishing these two categories of effort is important because they are important in
different ways when it comes to moral evaluation.
Let’s first look at the way in which subjective effort plays a role in moral evaluation.
Consider two students who vandalize school property. The first, A, is a student who does not
think twice before vandalizing school property. B, on the other hand, hesitates and finds it
harder to bring himself to do so, but eventually does it anyways. Both students appear to have
done an action that is equally bad, and it would be strange for the school to mete out different
punishments for the two, assuming that they have similar disciplinary histories with the school.
Yet, we are still inclined to evaluate A more negatively than B. In other words, a person who
expends less subjective effort to commit a harmful action is evaluated more negatively than a
person who needs to expend more subjective effort to commit the same action.
The reverse seems to be true for good acts, which seems intuitive. For example, consider
two people of the same economic status who each donates $10 to a charity. The first, A, finds it
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very easy to donate the $10. On the other hand, the second, B, also donates the $10, but she
finds it difficult to do so and needs to spend additional subjective effort in order to bring herself
to actually donate the money. In this situation, the two people perform equally good actions that
will presumably result in the same amount of good. But while we do not look at A’s action and
say that she has performed an action that is better than B’s action, we do look at the two people
differently. A appears to be the type of person who finds it easy to donate, and a better person
who generally finds it easy to help others. B, however, does not seem as good of a person as A
because of how much harder it was for B to donate. In other words, the lower the amount of
subjective effort it takes for a person to do a good act, the more positively the person is
evaluated.
One might point out that there seem to be cases that contradict my observation that we
evaluate people more positively when they only need to spend a small amount of subjective
effort to do a good action. Consider Nigel2, a person who has difficulties donating to charity not
only because of normal selfish desires but also because of a near pathological phobia of
donating. Despite this, Nigel expends a high amount of mental effort to work through his issues
and eventually brings himself to donate $10. Indeed, there seems to be something that is
praiseworthy about Nigel here for spending a high amount of subjective effort to do a good
action. However, I do not think this case necessarily has to contradict what I said earlier, which
is that an agent who only needs to spend a small amount of subjective effort in order to do a good
deed is evaluated more positively. This is because there seem to be two ways to look at (or set
up the case of) Nigel. In the first way, the enormous difficulty it takes for Nigel to donate is
closely tied to him as a person, to his moral character. So even though he is able to work through
his issues to donate, there is still something wrong with Nigel as a person that he had to exert so
2

Kelly Sorensen, “Effort and Moral Worth,” Ethic Theory Moral Prac 13 (2010), pp. 89-109.
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much subjective effort just to donate $10. In this interpretation of Nigel, we in fact don’t
evaluate Nigel positively, and any such feeling reminiscent of positive evaluation that we have is
really only positive in the context and to the standards of Nigel as a bad person who is trying not
to be as bad as he is. In the second interpretation, the enormous difficulty it takes for Nigel to
donate is truly pathological – a genuine illness outside of and separate from Nigel’s person, his
moral character. In this case, it seems that we could categorize working through his illness as a
factor of objective effort. So just like how we would say that a person with a busy schedule who
spends an hour to do an action spends more objective effort than a person with a relaxed
schedule who also spends an hour, we should say that Nigel’s donating requires more objective
effort than person A or person B’s donating did. In this case, the $10 donation by Nigel, a
person with this mental illness, does make Nigel a more admirable person because of a
difference in objective effort, which is not related to my observation about subjective effort.
Thus, I don’t think Nigel’s case or similar cases are contradictions to the general trend that when
a person does not need to expend much subjective effort to do a good action, we evaluate him
more positively.
It may be tempting to use objective effort as an agent-evaluating tool as well – after all, a
person who volunteers for three hours may seem more praiseworthy than a person with a similar
schedule who spends less objective effort and volunteers for one hour. But I believe that this
temptation should be resisted. Though one person may have done something better
(volunteering for longer), the person may have had to exert a high amount of subjective effort in
order to bring himself to do that action and had to really force himself to do something good.
The other person who volunteered for one hour, on the other hand, might have hardly expended
any subjective effort at all, and perhaps would even have volunteered for three hours without
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hesitation and with no more subjective effort if given the chance. Thus, knowing subjective
effort provides critical information about the person acting that objective effort does not provide.
Objective effort is useful, however, in helping us evaluate an action on its own, apart
from who performs it and without considering how much subjective effort it took, specifically
because it involves characteristics of an action that are objective and consistent across different
people. Furthermore, its usefulness in act evaluation also seems to make it a useful factor to
consider in cases of decision making when one is choosing to do or not do an action because
when a person decides to do or not do something, he considers factors having to do with the
action itself (like objective effort). Subjective effort, on the other hand, does not seem quite as
useful. If a person finds that he must expend a lot of subjective effort in order to do good, and as
a result discovers he is less admirable than someone who does not need to spend that much
subjective effort, this is no reason for him to not do a good action, which is still good regardless
of his lessened admirableness. Or if a person finds that he would have to spend a lot of
subjective effort in order to do harm and is thus more admirable than someone who does not
spend much subjective effort at all doing harm, this person’s increased admirableness would not
somehow make doing harm less bad. Such considerations about subjective effort and its
implications on one’s character seem like they should be made separately from the
considerations about the characteristics of an action (such as the objective effort involved in
performing the action) that are relevant to deciding on whether to perform an action or not. So
objective effort seems relevant in act evaluation and decision making in a way that subjective
effort is not.
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Objective Effort and Act Evaluation
To see how objective effort affects how we think about the moral evaluation of an action,
let us consider cases where the same person carries out two different actions. Compare a case in
which a person trips someone walking past them in the hallway by sticking her foot out and a
case in which the same person instead sees someone walking in the hallway on the other side of
the school, runs over, and sticks her foot out to trip the person. Though both actions result in the
tripping of another person, the second action, which requires additional time and physical
exertion to complete the action, seems worse than the first. Thus, it seems that the amount of
objective effort expended on its own can make the action of harming seem worse and magnify
the wrongness of an action.
In a similar manner, more objective effort seems to magnify the goodness of a helping or
benefiting act. For example, a person might donate blood at a local blood drive that is
conveniently located at her place of work, or she may instead be in a situation in which she does
not have the same convenience so she instead finds a place where she could donate blood, makes
her way to that place, and then donates the same amount of blood. Though both actions help
people equally, the second act seems to be the better act because of the additional effort
involved. There is something about effort itself that plays a role in the way we look at these
actions despite holding other aspects of the actions, such as the consequences, constant.

Some might point out certain cases that seem to contradict this magnification effect in
which more objective effort makes a harmful action seem worse or a good action better.
Consider a person, A, who casually kills others – it seems like there might be something more
sinister going on there than that with someone else, B, who plans out a murder. Especially in
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movies and TV, people like A seem even scarier than B. Gus Fring in the TV series Breaking
Bad seems like a perfect example of someone like A. Gus Fring is a man who is polite,
professional, calm, and skilled at his job as drug kingpin. Despite his calm demeanor, in one of
the most memorable episodes of the series, Fring quietly changes into hazmat gear, picks up a
box cutter, and effortlessly slices the throat of his right-hand man for seemingly no good reason.
These sorts of actions cement Fring as one of the most villainous characters in the series despite
being portrayed as a quiet, calm person. However, I think this sort of contradiction to my
observation that high objective effort makes a harmful action seems worse is one that is based on
muddling the distinction between objective and subjective effort. When we look at people like A
and Gus Fring, we are shocked because this person commits such a harmful act with such little
subjective effort. If A or Gus Fring then proceeded to commit another similarly horrible murder
that was much more planned and effortful, that second murder would be even worse than the first
murder because of the additional objective effort; this would conform with my observation that
more objective effort magnifies the wrongness of a harming action. Furthermore, if B, after
carrying a planned out murder then also killed someone casually like A did, of course we would
also be equally shocked by B as we were with A because of how little subjective effort B spends
to kill. But B was initially only presented as the person who spent more objective effort, and as a
result, the higher objective effort was muddled with what we assumed was her level of subjective
effort. In other words, we were initially more shocked by A because we assumed B’s planning
meant she was not as flippant about murder as A, but in reality, B’s planning and objective effort
said nothing about B as a person and her subjective effort. So when setting up cases to help us
understand objective effort, it is important to hold subjective effort constant by not using two
different people (like A and B) and ensure that our evaluation and visceral reaction to subjective
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effort does not cloud our understanding of objective effort.3 Taking this into account and
looking again at the actions of casual and planned murder with the same person, we can better
understand how objective effort matters. So instead of comparing a casual murder by A and a
planned murder by B, let’s compare a casual murder by A to a planned murder by A. It seems to
me that the murder that A does think about, plan, and try harder to execute seems like the worse
action than the one where she does not, even if the consequence to the victim is held constant.
This again follows the trend in which more objective effort magnifies the wrongness of a
harming action.
Keeping the person the same in these cases like this is important in order to hold other
characteristics of the person constant as well. While my focus is on effort, consequences, and
actions, I do not want to pretend that other factors do not play an important role in the way we
evaluate agents and actions. These factors might include the reasons for which a person
performs an action or the intentions behind an action4, which are unique to the individual
performing the actions. But because objective effort is my focus here, it would be ideal to hold
constant the person performing the action while only changing the objective effort involved in an
action. In this way, other potentially conflating factors affecting our intuitions of moral
evaluation can be controlled for while focusing on objective effort.

So generally it seems that more objective effort magnifies the goodness or wrongness of
an action. However, the way objective effort has this magnification effect is not symmetrical
3

This is why when I set up the subjective cases earlier, I compared two different people (e.g. “Person A” and
“Person B”) while in setting up the objective cases I used one person (e.g. “the same person”).
4
Some might say that the only factor that matters is the agent’s intentions behind an action and cannot see how
objective effort matters at all. I do not think addressing this objection fully is possible here. However, I do hope
that, first, my cases above comparing actions performed with different levels of objective effort seem at least
somewhat plausible even for people who do not see how actions could be considered on their own, and, second, that
we might find some common ground in considering how subjective effort plays a role in agent evaluation.
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between helping and harming actions. A harming action seems bad whether it requires a low
amount of effort or a high amount of effort, though more effort magnifies how bad such an
action actually is. Tripping someone next to me requires only a small amount of objective effort
(sticking my foot out), and it seems wrong, though not as wrong as running across a school
campus to trip someone.
However, helping or benefiting actions do not always seem to be good in the same way
that harming actions always seem bad. If I walk through a door and hold the door for the person
right behind me who is on crutches, this would not be praiseworthy – it is merely neutral. If I
instead noticed someone some distance away who is on crutches and stay at the door for some
time so that I could hold the door open, this seems somewhat praiseworthy. I need to expend
more effort than just sticking my arm out to hold the door for a second before my helping action
of holding the door open can be called good or praiseworthy. This is different from harming
actions. Even if I only expended a small amount of effort, the harming action of tripping
immediately seems wrong. I don’t need to expend a certain amount of effort before it becomes
wrong like I would have to in order for holding the door to become good. This difference
between the way in which objective effort affects helping and harming actions might be even
clearer with a more extreme case. If a child starts to drown in a kiddie pool in someone’s lawn
as I am walking by on the sidewalk and all I need to do is take one step and upright the child,
doing so is not heroic at all. It is neutral and expected. If the child were instead in the middle of
an extremely wide river and I jump in, swim the tremendous distance despite my burning, aching
muscles, and drag the child back to land, this action seems to me to be praiseworthy. So it seems
that a certain amount of objective effort is necessary to expend before even saving a life becomes
praiseworthy. Contrast this with how murder is immediately wrong regardless of the amount of
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effort. If I pressed a button that would kill someone, even this low amount of effort would
immediately be wrong. It might be less wrong than if I instead spent more objective effort and
constructed a device that would kill someone with a push of a button and then pressed the button,
but it is nonetheless still wrong. Thus, a helping action does not seem to actually become good
until the action requires a certain amount of effort; this is different than with harming actions – a
low effort harming is not neutral in the same way a low effort helping is (Figure 1).5

Figure 1. The asymmetric effect of objective effort on the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness
on harming and helping actions.6

5

Some will share my intuitions here; some may not. Below, I offer some explanations of my intuitions that I
believe would satisfy both those who share my intuitions and those who do not because I think these explanations
can stand on their own apart from what one’s intuitions actually are.
6

Of course, I do not want to pretend this graph shows anything exact or that the slopes on the helping effort and
harming effort side should be the same. I am only trying to show what I mean by the asymmetry.
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A similar asymmetry is seen with cases of not harming and not helping or benefiting
(Figure 2). Not harming seems to be mostly neutral, regardless of whether the harm that was not
done would have been low effort or high effort. If I don’t trip someone right next to me, the
omission of my tripping is simply neutral. If I don’t trip someone across school campus, again,
my omission is neutral. So whether or not the harming action would have required only a little
amount of objective effort or a lot does not matter, and the omission of the harming action is
neutral regardless. However, effort does seem to matter with omissions of helping or benefiting
actions. Not doing a high effort helping or benefiting seems neutral. But not doing a low effort
helping or benefiting seems like a blameworthy omission. For example, I might not hold the
door for someone on crutches who is somewhat far off. It might be nice if I stayed there and
held the door, but not doing so seems neutral. If the person were right behind me, however, and
I let the door slam right behind me and I did not even expend the small amount of effort to hold
the door for a second, this instead seems wrong. Additionally, it seems to me that the
blameworthiness of not expending a small amount of effort to help someone increases
“asymptotically” in that the blameworthiness seems to increase by a greater amount than the
amount by which the omitted objective effort decreases. For example, the blameworthiness of
not waiting one second to hold a door for someone seems more than “five times” worse than the
blameworthiness of not waiting five seconds to hold a door for someone. These intuitions about
the blameworthiness of not spending a small amount of effort to help someone and the neutrality
of not spending a large amount of effort to help someone and of not spending effort to harm are
shown in Figure 2.

Lee 15

Figure 2. Objective effort and the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of omitted actions.

Much of what I have been doing until now was describing what our (or at least my)
intuitions are about the types of effort there are and how effort matters when it comes to moral
evaluation. I will now try to explain why I believe effort matters and explain where our
intuitions come from.

Why Does Objective Effort Matter?
It seems to me that the importance of effort is better explained in a non-utilitarian context
than a utilitarian one. Consider the form of contractualism set forth by T. M. Scanlon. In this
form of contractualism, “an act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be
disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of behaviour that no one could
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reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced, general agreement.”7 Contractualism differs
from other non-utilitarian theories in several ways. Unlike other related theories like
contractarianism which is more focused on how those engaged in the social contract would
maximize their self-interest, contractualism asks how individuals who respected each other as
moral equals would justify the pursuit of their interests to others. In other words, an agent under
contractualism justifies himself to others because others are also equal moral agents, while an
agent under contractarianism justifies himself to others because of the strategic value of working
with others in order to maximize his own self-interest. Contractualism also differs from the
moral theory of Kant and Rawls in that contractualism asks what principles no one would be able
to reject, as opposed to principles that all would agree to, which Kant and Rawls focus on.8
As a contractualist, one would ask what kind of burden a certain principle places on him
and how that burden compares to the burdens imposed on others by that principle. If a burden
placed on him is too great or if a burden is distributed unfairly based on morally arbitrary
criteria, he might reasonably reject that principle. However, if the burden is great but
alternatives to the principle result in even greater burdens on others or give others more pressing
reasons to reject a principle, the principle might not be rejected. Using this kind of reasoning
and by paying attention to the strengths of the reasons those affected by a principle have to reject
it, a contractualist would assess the acceptability of a principle. Here, there seems to be space for
effort to pay a role. If a principle requires an excessive level of effort to help someone, it can be
reasonably rejected by the person on whom the burden of effort is placed. However, a principle
might also demand a reasonable level of effort from someone to help others, and cannot

7

8

T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

Ashford, Elizabeth and Mulgan, Tim, "Contractualism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2012
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/contractualism/>.
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reasonably be rejected. Therefore, actions of this level of effort that follow the principle are
simply what are required because they abide by this principle, while omitting such actions are a
violation of the principle. Thus, the change from required to not required as the effort of a
helping action increases can be explained by what levels of effort can be reasonably demanded
of someone in a moral framework in which moral equals consider the reasons for which others
might reasonably reject a moral principle, and whether the effort exerted for the helping action
merely satisfies an acceptable principle or goes above and beyond what can be demanded or
expected.

But while I believe that part of the importance of objective effort can be explained by
contractualism, I do not think that this explanation is complete on its own. Contractualism
explains whether an action is right or wrong based on whether or not it violates a set of principles
that no one could reasonably reject. But while it explains right and wrong, it does not seem to
say much about praiseworthiness. If a helping action has a level of effort associated with it that
goes above and beyond what a non-rejectable principle demands, the action is simply categorized
as not wrong. I presume that a contractualist would see this action as one that is praiseworthy as
well, but it is hard to guess how a contractualist might explain why this would be without a
theory of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness distinct from a contractualist account of right
and wrong. Can an action not violate a principle more than another action also does not violate
the principle? Such a question seems nonsensical. Thus, as effort increases, rather than
transitioning from required to praiseworthy as I have been describing, with praiseworthiness
scaling up as effort scales up, contractualism seems to simply lump together lower effort helping
actions that barely surpass what a principle demands and higher effort ones under the category of
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justifiable. Furthermore, a similar issue arises when considering contractualism and
blameworthiness. As the effort of a harming action increases, the blameworthiness seems to
increase as well. So running across the school to trip someone seems like a more blameworthy
action than tripping someone next to me in the hall. But does it make sense to ask whether I
violated the principle that requires me to not trip people more or violated it harder in the first
case than in the second? Because these principles deal with whether an action is justifiable or
not, it seems easy to give importance to effort in affecting what actions can be demanded or
prevented by a principle, but harder to explain the spectrum of blameworthiness and
praiseworthiness that different levels of effort seems to create.
Therefore, rather than only looking to contractualism, I will also look to virtue ethics for
an explanation of why effort seems to matter. In contractualism, right and wrong is determined
by whether an action is allowed or not by principles that cannot reasonably be rejected. In
utilitarianism, right and wrong is determined by whether an action produces a net increase or
decrease in utility. Virtue ethics takes a different approach. Virtue ethics would look at an
action and ask whether it is in line with what a virtuous agent would do. This virtuous agent is
one who has and exercises the virtues, which are deep character traits that reveal the agent’s
grasp of eudaimonia. Although eudaimonia is difficult to describe, it can be thought of as
happiness or flourishing in a deeper sense, happiness that is worth pursuing and flourishing that
is unique for rational beings. A person living a eudaimon life pursues what is “truly worthwhile,
truly important, and thereby truly advantageous in life”9.
With this understanding of virtue ethics, I believe that the importance of effort and
helping actions can be explained. Even a person who is not very virtuous at all would prevent

9

Hursthouse, Rosalind, "Virtue Ethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), Edward N.
Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/ethics-virtue/>.
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harm or aid someone if it required only a certain low level of effort. Therefore, a low effort
helping action, which is an action that even a person who is just barely virtuous could be
compelled to do, merely falls under the category of neutral; actions that are characteristic of a
person who is hardly virtuous are not praiseworthy. Furthermore, when this low effort helping
action is omitted, the omission is blameworthy – if a person who is hardly virtuous would
perform a helping action that requires only a small level of effort, omitting that action would of
course be typical of someone who is not virtuous at all, and instead someone who is vicious and
lazy. But as the effort expended for the helping action increases, these actions become
characteristic of what increasingly virtuous agents would do because a virtuous person pursues
what is worthwhile and exerts effort doing that which the virtues compel him to do. Thus,
helping actions that require more and more effort become more and more praiseworthy because
more fully having the virtues and being able to enjoy eudaimonia is praiseworthy. These actions
embody in a fuller sense what is means to be charitable, generous, and compassionate. But while
such actions are praiseworthy, omissions of such actions would be more neutral because omitting
such actions would be typical of an agent who, while clearly not highly virtuous, is not
necessarily one that lacks any virtue at all or one that is vicious.
Besides the interplay between effort and helping actions, the interplay between effort and
harming actions seem to be explained in the context of virtue ethics as well. Just as helping
actions are characteristic of virtuous people, harming actions are typical of vicious people. A
vicious person would be cruel, stingy, or selfish. The more vicious a person, the more effort
such a person would devote towards harming actions. Therefore, increasing effort put into a
harming action makes the action increasingly blameworthy because the action is increasingly
characteristic of blameworthy vices.
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One might notice, however, that virtue ethics on its own is also incomplete in its ability to
explain why effort matters in the opposite way that contractualism was incomplete. Virtue ethics
seems powerful in its ability to explain the spectrum of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness
that arises from varying levels of effort and its ability to explain why subjective effort matters,
aspects in which contractualism was inadequate. However, it is difficult to explain how a switch
from impermissible to permissible could occur just using virtue ethics. With contractualism, this
was easier to explain – whether an action is disallowed or required by a principle dictated by
contractualism explained whether an action was impermissible or permissible. But virtue ethics
seems to deal more with how much an action embodies a virtue or a vice without dealing with
concepts of duty, requirement, permissibility and impermissibility. Without engagement with
these concepts, it is not possible to explain why it seems that omitting a helping action that
would have required only a low level of effort is impermissible while omitting a helping action
that required a high level of effort is permissible. Consequently, it becomes harder to explain
why certain do/allow cases appear to make doing and allowing seem equivalent while others
make doing and allowing seem significantly different. Considering this weakness, it seems best
to understand the importance of effort from multiple perspectives rather than just virtue ethics or
just contractualism.

However, despite the differences in the strengths and weaknesses of the explanations
from contractualism and virtue ethics for the moral importance of effort, what I believe to be the
important, and perhaps in a way, obvious, common premise is that we do not have an unlimited
amount of effort.
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Imagine that there are two children drowning at two different points in time. One is the
child who we are familiar with, the one who is right next to me drowning in a kiddie pool. The
other is drowning in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. Let’s suppose that I do not save either. I
do not bend over and exert the approximately 20 lbs. of force to upright the child drowning in the
kiddie pool; nor do I make the plans to rent a helicopter, seek out a rescue team who would know
how to pilot the helicopter and perform at-sea rescue missions, take off for what would
presumably be an all-day mission, dive into the ocean, and then save the child. Here, it seems
clear to me that the objective effort required to save the child in the kiddie pool is so ludicrously
low that saving the kiddie pool is absolutely required of me, so I act impermissibly by not saving
this child. But that I do not save the child in the Atlantic Ocean seems to me to be permissible
because the objective effort required to do so seems so high. Of course, it would be nice if I did
make the effort to save the child, but doing so would be praiseworthy, but not required. So the
difference in level of objective effort causes a distinct change between failing to save one child
and failing to save the other that makes one impermissible and the other permissible. We can
explain how effort causes this change from impermissible to permissible using contractualism
and virtue ethics. Saving the child in the kiddie pool is morally required because it violates the
reasonable principle that all can agree upon that people should expend a small amount of effort
when it means saving a life (contractualism), especially when even a person who minimally
expresses the virtues would be able to find the compassion and charity to save the child in this
scenario (virtue ethics).
But note that both parts of this explanation, the part from contractualism and from virtue
ethics, depend on the fact that objective effort is not unlimited. What makes a principle that can
govern our behavior reasonable? The reasonable-ness of the principle comes from the fact that it
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does not demand too much of our limited reserve of effort. If we had an unlimited amount of
effort and never grew weary of exerting effort, it would not make sense to say something
requires “too much” of this unlimited resource and we would not need to even refer to what is
considered reasonable. Principles would merely have to refer to what outcomes we should effect
with no reference to how hard it would be to effect those outcomes. But we in fact do have a
limited amount of effort, so a principle cannot demand too much effort if it is to not be
reasonably rejected. Of course, this also makes it such that doing an action that requires a lot of
effort is praiseworthy. What makes spending effort to help others virtuous? That it is virtuous to
expend effort to help others, and that spending more and more effort makes one more and more
virtuous, comes from the fact that, again, we have a limited amount of effort, so spending more
and more of that limited amount towards helping others is characteristic of one who is
compassionate, charitable.
To make this point clearer, let’s imagine there exists an omnipotent being. If she does
not save either the child in the kiddie pool or the child in the middle of the Atlantic, both seem
bad, but neither seems worse than the other. It seems to me that the being’s omitting to save the
child in the kiddie pool and her omitting to save the child in the Atlantic Ocean are equally
wrong because saving one or the other is the same to this being. Additionally, if she saves both,
neither rescue seems praiseworthy. The difference in objective effort that would have been
involved with the two rescues that was important for us is not important for this being. In fact,
the word “effort” would not have any meaning for such a being – this being does not try, she
simply does. So referencing contractualism or virtue theory at all would be incoherent for this
being.
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Of course, unlike this being, we as human beings are not omnipotent. We have
limitations when it comes to strength, time, stamina, money, and effecting the outcomes we want
in the universe. In other words, we do not have unlimited objective effort to spend. So we
allocate objective effort throughout our days, weeks, years, and lives to the particular pursuits we
deem to be worthy. And it turns out that we ought to allocate at least some of this valuable
commodity for certain things – aiding others. Whether we explain why we ought to allocate this
amount of effort through the lens of the principles that can reasonably govern our behavior or the
virtues that would cause someone to behave in a certain way, the fact that this positive demand
exists seems to me to hold true. Though we might permissibly not expend effort beyond what
this positive demand requires because we presumably have other worthy pursuits that are
deserving of our effort, when we fail to expend the amount of objective effort on which this
positive demand has a claim, we have surely acted in an impermissible manner. Furthermore, if
we were to go even further and deem harming others as a pursuit worthy of our limited effort, it
seems clear that we have organized our lives in a deficient way and that we have failed to
recognize what is worth spending our objective effort on, even if it is a small amount that we
spend.10
The idea that we have a limited amount of effort to spend also says something about
whether increasing objective effort spent on a helping action always increases praiseworthiness
at a constant rate. Consider a person who agrees with my observation that increasing effort

10

It might seem strange that I keep referencing the person (“we”) performing the action here even though I
previously said that objective effort is important for act evaluation and not agent evaluation. However I am not
referencing one specific person or another and trying to evaluate a specific person; instead, I am referencing the
general property of people that we cannot exert effort ad infinitum. Without referencing this general property, I
cannot talk about effort at all. It is only in reference to beings that have limitations that effort matters, so I must
refer to the being performing the action, at least at this point in the discussion. Once we establish this, we can move
on and focus on the relationship between objective effort and actions because the additional step of relating actions
to the general nature of beings with limitations for which morality applies (which I am doing here) is assumed.
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generally seems to increase praiseworthiness. This person spends his entire day running around
his office building holding doors for people, exerting a great amount of effort in doing so. He
spends a great amount of physical energy and time, and even stays late after work to hold more
doors for people. Holding the door like this seems to be a somewhat more praiseworthy action
than holding the same number of doors just causally when the opportunity arises. But surely not
by much, and even if it were more praiseworthy, there seems to be something strange about
exerting so much effort to hold doors. So increasing the amount of objective effort spent to help
others does not increase the praiseworthiness of an action at very high amounts to the same
extent it does at lower amounts (Figure 3). This sort of tapering can be explained by the fact that
we do not have unlimited effort to spend. A fully virtuous person would see the good in exerting
some level of effort to hold doors for others, but because objective effort is not unlimited, he
would distribute his limited effort accordingly across other pursuits, relationships, and helping
actions throughout his day characteristic of a moral, eudaimon life. Therefore, the action of
running around to hold doors increases in praiseworthiness with increasing effort at a fairly
consistent rate until the point at which holding doors hampers a person’s ability to distribute
effort among other important pursuits.11

11

Another factor that could explain why there seems to be something off about the holding doors with a great deal
of objective effort is that it seems that a person who does so aims at being praiseworthy. There does indeed seem to
be something strange about trying so hard to be morally praiseworthy that makes the person trying ironically less
praiseworthy. This may be due to the fact that such a person might wrongly be motivated disproportionately more
by his own moral worth than the needs of others; or perhaps this person is misguided in setting an aim (high moral
praiseworthiness) that is unrealistic or at least not achievable through the act of holding doors. (For more on this
paradox, see Kelly Sorensen, “The Paradox of Moral Worth,” Journal of Philosophy 9 (2004) pp. 465-483.) These
and other reasons might even make my asking whether there is an upper limit to praiseworthiness seem strange
because perhaps even asking the question is motivated by a wrongful focus on aiming directly at being
praiseworthy. However, this factor of trying too hard to be morally praiseworthy seems to deal more closely with a
specific type of intent that makes high objective effort door holding wrong. So while this factor is surely important,
in my aim to deal more generally with the action of high objective effort door holding, I focus on the limited nature
of objective effort and praiseworthiness rather than focusing on a factor that only applies if we know something
specific about why a person does something and whether the person is in fact aiming at praiseworthiness in
performing an action.
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Figure 3. Diminishing returns on praiseworthiness as effort increases for a helping action.

At this point, I would like to refer back to this rough graph I presented earlier (Figure 4):

Figure 4. Modified Figure 1 with regions of required levels of effort highlighted in orange and
permissible/praiseworthy levels of effort highlighted in blue.
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I have boxed here in orange the area that I described earlier as the range of objective effort where
effort merely makes an action neutral, and I have boxed here in blue the area where additional
effort makes an action increasingly praiseworthy. If we were talking about holding the door, in
orange would be holding the door for someone right behind me, and in blue would be waiting
that extra time to hold the door for someone somewhat further away. If we were talking about
saving drowning children, in orange would be the child in the kiddie pool, and in blue would be
jumping into an extremely wide river or going out into the middle of the Atlantic. At the
beginning of this paper, I only sought to describe our intuitions, but I hope by now I have given
an explanation of why the orange seemed neutral and why the blue seems praiseworthy. The
orange seemed neutral because this is the amount of effort that is required of us. The blue seems
praiseworthy because this is the amount of effort that is permissible and praiseworthy. In other
words, the dividing point between the two depicted boxes is the change from required to
permissible that effort itself can cause in the status of an action. Why this shift exists was
explained above by contractualism through the principles that govern our behavior morally that
we cannot reasonably reject and the effort that such principles require us to expend to help
others.
Having pointed out that this explanation depends on the fact that there are limitations to
how much we can exert objective effort, I would now like to point out what one formulation of a
contractualist principle might look like that would determine how low the effort associated with
a helping action needs to be such that the associated action becomes required, instead of merely
permissible. One might have noted earlier that when I said that we do not have an unlimited
objective effort, I was a bit careless in saying this. Because although I surely cannot always be
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jumping into rivers and the Atlantic as I would run out of effort, it seems that when it comes to a
few certain actions that require a minimal amount of objective effort and are spaced apart from
other actions, spending that level of objective effort actually seems unlimited. For example,
wiggling a finger a few millimeters and blinking one’s eyes once in a while are actions that
require such little objective effort that, if one wanted, one could do indefinitely. So it seems that
a certain low amount of effort does not tap into our limited “reserve” of effort but can be spent
infinitely. It also seems that I could not reasonably reject a principle that says that I ought to
expend part of something of which I have an infinite amount if doing so means helping others.
Thus, a way to formulate the specific standard or principle by which a certain amount of
objective effort can be required through contractualism would be to say that the amount of
objective effort that can be exerted that is low enough and spaced apart far enough from other
actions such that one can exert this effort indefinitely without growing tired is the amount of
effort that can be required of someone to aid or help another.

Why Does Subjective Effort Matter?
Earlier, I referenced virtue ethics as a way to morally assess actions because
understanding the virtues also provides a guide for action. But virtue ethics can assess both
actions and agents because a moral theory based on virtues and vices is in a lot of ways, at its
core, about morally assessing whether agents are virtuous or vicious. Therefore, virtue ethics
seems like the optimal lens through which we can look at the importance of subjective effort,
which is primarily useful in agent evaluation. Aristotle describes four categories of people: the
virtuous, the continent, the incontinent, and the vicious. The virtuous find it easy to do what is
good or even delight in doing what is good. Those who are continent, or those who have
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strength of will, are like the virtuous in that they do what is good, but because they are not fully
virtuous, they struggle against other temptations in doing so. It is not easy for the continent to
always do good, and it takes a certain level of subjective effort for them to do good.12 The
incontinent, on the other hand, do not have the strength of will. While they understand what they
should do, they do not have the strength of will to overcome other temptations and instead do
wrong. The vicious are altogether bad. They have no problem doing wrong and they do not
spend any subjective effort doing wrong because it is easy for them to do so. Using Aristotle’s
categorization, what I described to be subjective effort seems to arise from the struggle between
different parts of the soul as a person is doing a certain action. The more virtuous a person, the
less subjective effort she spends doing good because she is naturally inclined to do good and
there is less internal struggle in her soul, while the reverse is true when it comes to bad actions.
The more vicious a person, the more subjective effort she spends doing good because the part of
her soul that wants to do bad struggles harder, while she finds she spends less or no subjective
effort doing bad.
Of course, the concept of doing high effort helping actions with low subjective effort as
an ideal is not unique to Aristotle. An analog to this type of thought can be seen in the concept
of wu-wei in mainly Daoist, but also other Chinese philosophy. Just as the virtues are Aristotle
and other virtue ethicists’ answer to how to live a eudaimon life, wu-wei is an answer to the

12

The implication here is that those who are continent are worse than those who are virtuous, and are thus less
admirable. One might note that there are cases, however, where a person who struggles to do good nonetheless
seems admirable. For example, a person in a seriously difficult financial situation who finds a wallet might struggle
to find the rightful owner, yet this person would still be admirable for doing so. However, this does not contradict
the implication that the continent are still less admirable than the virtuous. If another person in the same situation
found the wallet and had no trouble at all returning the wallet, he seems clearly more admirable. So the person who
struggles to give the wallet back is admirable only because most of us are not fully virtuous, so we admire him as a
fellow person who is not fully virtuous who was able to overcome his temptations. If we compared the person to the
standards of the fully virtuous, the person would come up short. A similar observation was discussed above with the
Nigel case, in which Nigel struggles tremendously to give a small amount to charity.
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question of how to live a good life. Wu-wei can be translated as “doing things in a spontaneous
and natural manner”.13 This does not mean simply being spontaneous in an action, but
spontaneous in a deeper sense – acting without a forced intention or heavy premeditation because
of one’s natural flow. Achieving wu-wei is difficult, and almost paradoxical as trying to be
spontaneous goes against the very definition of spontaneity. Furthermore, the way in which
different schools of thought like Confucianism and Daoism advise achieving wu-wei are
different; the former advises cultivating wu-wei through hard work while the latter focuses on
more of an attunement of oneself with the cosmic flow. Regardless, efforts like clearing the
mind of ulterior motives, cultivating one’s virtues and dispositions, attuning oneself to the
cosmic flow, and promoting harmony within oneself and with others seems key. Then, by living
with wu-wei, a person leads a “naturally rewarding and spontaneously meaningful” life by
revealing his “natural self and developing genuine character”. This display of one’s true self also
cultivates trust amongst oneself and the community because one is not hiding his feelings or
intentions. Therefore, wu-wei is not important just for the individual, but for the community as a
whole. This vein that runs through both Aristotelian virtue ethics and wu-wei of the importance
of effortlessness seems like the basis for my intuitions when it comes to subjective effort.

Beyond these moral theories, an additional explanation for the importance of subjective
effort is based on the fact that we are limited with respect to the amount of effort we can spend.
However, the fact that we are limited with respect the amount of effort we can spend is important
here in a way that is different from the way it was important in our discussion of objective effort.
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Edward Slingerland, Trying Not to Try: Ancient China, Modern Science and the Power of Spontaneity, (New
York: Crown, 2014).
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Consider the experiment performed by Baumeister et. al.14 In this experiment,
Baumeister et. al. would introduce a college student to a room that smelled of freshly baked
cookies. In front of the student were two plates: one with cookies and the other with radishes.
One lucky group of students was asked to eat the cookies while ignoring the radishes, while the
other group was asked to eat the radishes while ignoring the cookies. Afterwards, the students
were given a difficult questionnaire to complete. It turned out that the students who ate the
radishes (and had to exert more subjective effort to both eat the radishes and refrain from eating
the cookies) would be more likely to want to quit taking the questionnaire and reported feeling
more tired after taking the questionnaire that the other group of students (who had not spent any
subjective effort while they indulged in the cookies). They ran out of subjective effort to spend!
So given that we are limited not only with the amount of objective effort we can spend but with
subjective effort as well, another reason why someone who has to expend subjective effort to do
good seems deficient presents itself (besides the reason that a virtuous person would not need to
expend that effort). Eventually, a person who needs to constantly spend subjective effort to do
good will run out of subjective effort and end up being unable to do good. So, as we observed
previously, the less subjective effort a person needs to spend to do good, the more positively we
evaluate the person. In other words, a person should see doing good like they see eating cookies,
not like they see eating radishes (unless, of course, they happen to love radishes even more than
cookies.) This fact that there is a limit to subjective effort, when taken with the previous
explanation in terms of the virtues, which are morally important in and of themselves, seem to
provide an account of why subjective effort matters morally.
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Roy E Baumeister, Ellen Bratslavsky, Mark Muraven, and Dianne M. Tice, “Ego Depletion: Is the Active Self a
Limited Resource?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74:5 (1998), pp. 1252-65.
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Effort and What It Means to Do and Allow
I believe that the importance of the role of effort also extends outside of its importance in
morality. It also seems to play a key role in the metaphysical distinction that makes us see acting
in one sort of way as an “action” or a “doing” while see acting in another way as an “omission”
or an “allowing”.
On the surface, the question seems fairly easy. After all, it seems pretty clear that when I
upright the child in the kiddie pool, we would describe this as my doing something (saving the
child) and when I do not do so, we would describe this as my omitting to save the child or
allowing the child to drown. However, there are some cases where the distinction, at least
initially, seems to be cloudy. Consider the case of the mild earthquake15:
After a mild earthquake the agent finds herself lying on and crushing a tube
connected to a life support machine that is keeping someone alive. Unless the
agent moves soon, the victim will die from lack of oxygen. She stays put. The
victim dies.
Here, it seems on the surface that the agent did not do anything, but we would still say that the
agent killed the victim. Or consider the case of a rock rolling down a hill:
Suppose a man is lying asleep on the ground. He is awoken by a crash and notices
a large rock rolling down the hill towards him. He can easily move out of its way,
but realizes that if he does so the rock will gain momentum and kill a group of
small deaf children further down the hill. He tenses his muscles, fights his desire
to run away and stands his ground. The rock hits and seriously injures him. But he
stops it.
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Howard-Snyder, Frances, "Doing vs. Allowing Harm", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/doing-allowing/>.
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Here it seems like the man does nothing just as the agent earlier held still, but we would still say
that the man did something – he saves the children.
In looking at the distinction between doing/actions and allowing/omissions, Clarke
divides them into two categories.16 Some omissions are nothing – just absences of action. An
example of this kind of omission might be my not picking a friend up from the airport after
promising to do so. Clarke also sees some omissions as identical to actions. For example, if a
person does not move while playing hide-and-seek, this omission (“not moving”) seems identical
to the action of holding still. I imagine that Clarke would also look at the mild-earthquake case
and the rock-rolling-down-a-hill case and say that the omissions seen in both of the cases are
identical to the action of “holding still”. So although we initially said that the actors appear to
kill and save by not doing anything, Clarke would say that their omissions are not really
omissions at all, but omissions that are equivalent to an action – in other words, they do do
something.
However, I think that Clarke’s account could be a bit fuller. Just saying that some
omissions are identical to actions does not seem to help us think about when exactly we can
equate an omission with an action. For example, it seems clear that all cases of the omission of
not moving cannot simply be equated to the action of holding still. Consider another case of a
rock rolling down a hill:
Suppose a man is lying asleep on the ground. There is a crash, causing a large
rock to roll down the hill towards him, but the man remains asleep. Below the
man is a group of small deaf children further down the hill. The rock hits and
seriously injures the man, but he stops it.
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We would not look at this man and say that his not moving is the same as holding still. He does
not do anything to save the children in any meaningful way, except only in the sense that had he
not been sleeping there the children would have been hurt. Another case where it seems difficult
to answer whether an omission could be equated with an action is seen in the example earlier of
not picking a friend up from the airport after promising to do so. Although this was example was
given earlier as a case of an omission that is simply an absence of action, it is not clear why we
cannot simply equate this omission to the action of staying home.
I believe that instead of using the somewhat vague criterion of whether an omission can
be equated to an action, we should consider whether the choice taken by the actor required effort
or not. Not moving in hide-and-seek takes effort. It is difficult to not move, not make a sound,
and to stay hidden. It does not seem correct to call something that requires effort an omission,
and so this “omission” in fact is equivalent to the action of staying still. The rock-rolling-downa-hill case is similar. The man who wakes up to see a rock rolling down towards him tenses his
muscles, fights the natural instinct of self-preservation, and holds still. This is a high-effort
doing, not an omission. By contrast, had the man remained asleep, his not moving would have
taken no effort at all, and his accidental saving of the children can be called an omission.
One might say here that it seems like I am confusing effort for intent (because intentional
actions normally require effort and unintentional actions do not) and am simply describing
intentional things like holding still while awake as actions and unintentional things like not
moving while asleep as omissions. However, there are clear cases where intent and effort come
apart. I might not go pick up a friend from the airport and be fully aware of what I am (not)
doing. And despite the fact that I am intentionally not going to the airport, my not going to the
airport is an omission because it does not require any effort. Thus, it would not be right to use
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intent as a distinguishing characteristic between doings and omissions. Otherwise, only things
that I do unintentionally would be classified as omissions.
Rejecting intent as a distinguishing characteristic also means rejecting the level of effort
required in decision-making as a distinguishing characteristic between doings and omissions. If I
can intentionally omit an action, I am making a decision to omit it. And indeed, there is an
amount of effort associated with making a decision. Psychologist David Kahneman describes
two systems that our mind uses.17 System 1 operates automatically with no effort. It is the
system of thinking that is used when visually processing the relative distances of two objects or
solving 2 + 2. System 2, on the other hand, is more deliberate and effortful. So effortful, in fact,
that continuous System 2 thinking appears to tire out a person. Filling out tax forms, calculating
17 × 24, or writing an essay mobilize System 2 thinking. When someone makes a conscious
decision like deciding to omit an action, they also mobilize System 2 thinking.18 However,
though the simple action of making a decision on its own seems to require some effort based on
Kahneman’s research, I do not think this type of effort is sufficient to distinguish between doings
and omissions for the same reason I do not think intent is an appropriate criterion. I can surely
make a decision to omit to do something, so whatever effort that was associated with making that
decision should not be relevant. So a more refined version of my earlier criterion of whether a
choice “requires effort or not” would be whether a choice requires more than (action) or less
than/equal to (omission) the amount of effort associated with System 2 decision making.
Given this criterion, it seems clear that the hide-and-seek and boulder cases are examples
of actions that require more effort than that associated with decision making. A bit trickier is the
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Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011).

Using System 2 thinking seems to require what I have been calling subjective effort and also seems to be what
tired out the participants in the cookie-radish experiment mentioned above.
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mild-earthquake case. Here, at first glance, it may seem like the effort involved is only that
associated with decision making. Lying on the life support tube physically probably requires no
effort as one could simply rest on it. Thus, the difficulty with which one needs to hold still in
hide-and-go-seek does not even exist, nor does the difficulty involved with tensing one’s muscles
and fighting the instinct to avoid physical harm in the rock-rolling-down-a-hill case. Thus,
according to my criterion, the mild-earthquake case would be an example of an omission.
However, I do think that there is effort involved beyond just physical effort in the case of the
mild earthquake case. I think the agent who stays on the life support tube exerts “going-out-ofyour-way” effort or trajectory alteration effort. The agent’s normal course of action after an
earthquake would be to get up, to tend to one’s injuries, and to do other post-earthquake actions.
Had the victim not been connected to the life support tube, the agent would not have stayed on
the tube and would instead have gone about this course of action. But because the victim is
there, the agent changes the trajectory of actions relative to what he would have done normally
and stays resting on the tube. The “going-out-of-your-way” effort associated with this trajectory
alteration seems to me the minimal amount of effort needed to distinguish between a doing and
an omission, and the reason for which the mild-earthquake case is an example of a doing, not an
omission. Cases without this minimal level of effort are cases of omissions. For example,
consider again my not picking up a friend at the airport. There may be some decision-making
effort associated with my not picking my friend up. However, in deciding to continue on with
my day and not alter it in order to pick up my friend, I do not exert the “going-out-of-your-way”
or trajectory alteration effort. Therefore, this is a case of an omission. A final version of my
criterion for distinguishing a doing and an omission then becomes that a doing involves a level of
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effort greater than or equal to the trajectory alteration effort while an omission involves a level of
effort less than or equal to the effort involved in decision making.19
While using this kind of criterion and thinking in this manner generally leads to the same
conclusions that Clarke arrives at concerning whether something is an omission or an action (or
as Clarke calls it, an omission that is equivalent to an action), I feel that it clarifies why exactly
Clarke comes to his conclusions without the messiness of introducing the semantics of whether
an omission can be construed and reworded to sound like an action. Furthermore, if we define
more clearly the distinctions between doing and omitting, it also makes talking about other types
of cases concerning doing and allowing more clearly. For example, to say that someone kills is
to say that someone does something to bring about the death of another while letting die implies
that someone does not do anything, omits an action, and allows a another to die. However, the
word “kill” has a negative connotation to it that makes it tempting to say that someone kills
simply because we view him as responsible for another’s death. Yet responsibility and whether a
person did or allowed something often do not correlate with each other. If a friend asks me to
take care of a pet while she goes on vacation and I then proceed to ignore the pet and let it die,
my friend might say that I am responsible for her pet’s death and even go so far as to say that I
killed her pet, even though I did not actually do anything. My response to my friend would then
be, “I didn’t kill your pet, I only let it die – I omitted to take care of the pet, the option that does
not take effort. But because I seem so responsible for the death, you are mistakenly accusing me

19

I think an interesting question to ask here is whether the omnipotent being I mentioned earlier, for whom effort
has no meaning, can be said to do or allow anything if my account of what it means to do something and what it
means to allow something turns on whether a person (or being) exerts effort or not. It seems that I would be
committed to saying that it does not make sense to say that an omnipotent being, for which effort has no meaning,
can do or allow anything. This commitment actually seems correct to me. For an omnipotent being who controls
the very fabric of the universe, does it make sense to say that she allows a child to drown (as I somewhat
haphazardly said before)? Or would it make sense to say that she causes the child to drown? It seems to me that
what the being does (?) in this case is actually some sort of hybrid between the two for which I’m not sure I have a
term.
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of killing your pet!” Of course, my friend might still continue to say I killed the pet in everyday
conversation, but she would be missing my point that we should be clear with our usage of the
terms omissions/letting die and doing/killing without the additional baggage of perceived
responsibility when trying to understand what kind of distinctions there are between doing and
allowing.

Effort and the Distinction between Doing Harm and Allowing Harm
Given that we have now looked at how effort plays a role morally and in the distinction
between what we mean when someone does something or allows something, I now turn my
attention to the important question of whether doing harm is worse than allowing harm.
It seems to me that the participants in the discussion of whether doing harm is worse than
allowing harm often argue in a way such that one side argues that doing harm is always worse
than allowing harm while the other argues that there is never a difference between doing harm
and allowing harm. In order to prove or disprove that there exists a moral difference between
doing and allowing harm, each side constructs two cases in which everything is held constant
besides this whether the person in the case does harm or allows harm. These cases then appeal to
our intuitions about the moral permissibility of doing harm in one case and the moral
permissibility of allowing harm in the other; if our intuitions seem to say that there is no
difference, the side arguing that there is no difference claims they have succeeded, and if our
intuitions seem to say that there is a difference, the side arguing that there is a difference claims
they have succeeded.
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An example of this kind of method is seen in the Smith-Jones case given by Rachels.20
Smith is a man who would gain a large inheritance if his six-year-old cousin were to die. So one
evening while the cousin is taking his bath, Smith enters the bathroom and drowns the child in
order to gain the inheritance. Jones is another man who also stands to gain a large inheritance if
his six-year-old cousin were to die. One night, as Jones enters the bathroom in which the cousin
is taking a bath, he sees his cousin slip and hit his head, falling into the water. So Jones stands
by and lets the cousin drown. In this case, it seems that Jones’s omission is just as heinous as
Smith’s killing. Therefore, doing harm is no worse than allowing harm, and there is no moral
difference between doing harm and allowing harm. But while the intuition that Jones is just as
reprehensible as Smith seems correct, this case alone does not seem sufficient to show that there
really is no difference between doing and allowing harm. First, the acts or omissions that Smith
and Jones perpetrate are so heinous that, if there was indeed a difference between doing and
allowing harm, our strong visceral reactions in both cases might really be drowning out whatever
intuitions we might have about the potentially subtle difference between doing and allowing
harm. Second, if simply showing a case where our intuitions happen to line up with one’s claim
were enough, it seems that the other side can just as easily come up with cases in which our
intuition tells us that there is in fact a difference between doing and allowing harm.
For example, let’s create a case comparing a school bully and an older bystander. The
bully picks on a victim and steals the victim’s lunch money. Meanwhile, a bystander, who is
older than the bully and would be at no personal risk if he were to intervene, watches on and
allows the bullying to happen. While it would be nice if the bystander did something, our
intuition is that the bystander’s omission is still clearly better than if he had actually done the
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James Rachels, “Active and Passive Euthanasia,” New England Journal of Medicine, 292 (1975), pp. 78–86.
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bullying himself. Thus, in this case, it seems that doing harm is indeed worse than allowing
harm.
Considering that cases can be constructed in this manner easily to make doing harm out
to appear worse than allowing harm or instead make doing harm seem no worse than allowing
harm, this method of constructing cases is not a very effective way to discuss the difference
between doing and allowing. Because these sets of cases come out very differently despite the
only factor being changed is doing vs. allowing, there must be some other feature of these cases
that is more relevant beyond simply whether a case is a doing of harm or an allowing of harm.
Therefore, a discussion of doing and allowing harm must delve more deeply than simply
constructing cases. But not only that, we must look for other factors that are playing a role in our
intuitions in these cases besides the factor of whether a person does harm or allows harm. In
other words, we should not only look to answering the question of what factors are playing a role
in our intuitions in these cases by answering, “This is why doing is always worse than allowing,”
or, “This is why doing and allowing are always equivalent”. Answering the question in this
manner would simply lead us back wondering why one set of cases of doing and allowing harm
turn out one way while another set of cases turns out another way. Instead, an explanation for
these cases must be given that is not at its core based simply on whether a case is a doing or an
allowing, just as our intuition does not align cleanly and simply with doing and allowing.
However, it seems like often the discussion of doing and allowing does not go the way it
should. Quinn, for example, stakes out a position such that doing is always worse than allowing
by saying that killing is always worse than letting someone die.21 His explanation is based on the
difference between negative rights, which protect someone from being actively harmed by
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Warren Quinn, “Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing,” Philosophical
Review 98:3 (1989), pp. 287-312.
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others, and positive rights, which put a claim on others to help someone. Killing would be a case
of violating a negative right, while letting die is violating a positive right. Quinn believes that
negative rights are more serious because if a person’s negative right can be violated by being
killed to meet the positive rights of others, then the victim does not own his body in an important
moral way – rather, it belongs to the “human community”. Because negative rights are more
serious, violating a negative right is also more serious. Therefore, killing is worse than allowing
someone to die. But again, this type of explanation is one that ultimately reduces the distinction
between cases like the one mentioned above into saying doing harm is always worse than
allowing harm, albeit with an added explanation. It does not allow for the type of variation that
we see across cases and cannot explain why we do not see any difference between doing and
allowing harm in the case of Smith and Jones. On the other hand, Bennett, for example, finds
that there is no moral significance to the doing harm and allowing harm distinction.22 Bennett
starts by claiming that we say that an agent does something when the behavior that results in the
consequence of the doing would not have occurred from most of the other choices that the agent
could have made, while we say that an agent allows something when the behavior that results in
the consequence of the allowing would have occurred from most of the other choices that the
agent could have made. (In other words, his account of what it means to do something and what
it means to allow something is different from my account based on effort.) Then, Bennett’s
argument goes, because whether a consequence could have resulted from many ways that the
agent could have behaved or from a few ways that the agent could have behaved is morally
insignificant, the distinction between doing harm and allowing harm is also ultimately
insignificant. This seems problematic to me on the opposite end from Quinn’s argument. While
there are cases like the Smith-Jones case where the distinction does seem insignificant, there are
22
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surely cases where the distinction matters like in the bully-and-older-bystander case. Instead of
making doing harm consistently worse than allowing harm like Quinn’s argument does,
Bennett’s seems to consistently make the distinction between doing harm and allowing harm
insignificant.

I believe that looking at effort can elucidate this discussion.
Recall that allowing something to happen, on my account, means that one does not exert
effort for some outcome to occur. Not exerting effort is neutral when exerting it means harming
someone or when exerting it means helping someone but the level of exerted effort is high.
However, not exerting effort is impermissible in the case in which exerting that level of effort is
morally required, either because that level of effort is required by a principle that cannot be
reasonably rejected as a principle that governs moral behavior or because that level of effort is
minimal and will not be exerted frequently enough that it would deplete a person’s effort.
Therefore, allowing harm (which is equivalent to not exerting effort to help and prevent the
harm) is wrong when it the level of effort that would need to have been exerted to help is
required. The blameworthiness of allowing harm increases when as this level of effort decreases
even beyond that level which is required.23 What I believe to be of key importance here is that
the nature of what it means to allow something (not exerting effort) and the subsequent
explanation of when and why not exerting effort is wrong is the primary explanation for why
allowing harm is wrong. In a way, the exact nature of the harm that is prevented is secondary.
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As one can see in Figure 2, I believe that this blameworthiness increases asymptotically. Not exerting the pound
of force to wiggle my finger to save the child in the kiddie pool seems to me to be much, much more than “twenty
times” worse (whatever that might mean) than exerting twenty pounds of force to lift the child directly. But
regardless of whether this is in fact true, I hope it is at least plausible that the blameworthiness does indeed increase,
asymptotically or not.
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Another way to put this might be this: assume you are a parent with your child at a
playground and notice that your child stood idly by and watched while another child punched
someone. At another point in time, you notice that your child stood idly by while another child
stole another child’s toy. If you were to lecture your child about why standing idly by in these
situations is wrong, the lectures would not be about why punching is wrong and therefore why he
should prevent it or why stealing is wrong and why he should prevent it. In both cases, it would
probably instead be something about why he should help others in general and go out of his way
to help people in settings like the playground where it is easy to prevent these harms. In other
words, the way your child acted was not wrong because of the harms of punching and the harms
of stealing toys but because of his failure to exert effort to help others. Of course, this is not to
say that the nature of the harm does not matter at all. Saving a drowning child and preventing a
toy from being stolen surely modifies what level of effort is required. But this is still more of a
secondary modification rather than determining exactly why allowing harm is wrong, which was
based on the fact that morality can require one to exert effort to help others.
Notice how this is fundamentally different from the reason why doing harm is wrong.
Doing means exerting effort. In this situation of the morality of exerting effort, effort only has a
magnifying effect (except when the effort is that effort which is required.) Here, the reason why
doing something is wrong or right is primarily based on the ramifications of the action itself.
Effort then plays a role in magnifying this wrongness or rightness, but it is not playing the central
role of determining right and wrong like it did in the case of allowing harm. For example,
consider why it is wrong to trip someone. Tripping someone is wrong because of the nature of
the harm being caused, such as the physical pain involved in being tripped. It is not wrong
because it required effort to trip someone. More effort being involved in tripping someone
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makes the action of tripping worse because an action that requires more effort is more
characteristic of someone who is vicious (virtue theory) and because it uses more of the limited
amount of effort one has for harm (the idea that we have a limited amount of effort). But this is a
secondary modification of the blameworthiness of the action. Thus, when we consider why
doing harm is wrong, we look towards the exact nature of the harm that is being done, which is
different from the way we look at allowing harm, where we look first at the fact that effort that
was not exerted to aid another and then at the more specific details what exactly the aid that was
not provided was.
I believe that this way of explaining why doing harm is wrong and allowing harm is
wrong not only ends up being better at explaining our intuitions when it comes to cases of doing
and allowing harm, but I also believe that it reframes the discussion of doing harm and allowing
harm. Considering that the primary reasons for which doing harm and allowing harm are
different, it does not seem right to directly compare the two and ask whether one is better than
the other, just as it would be strange to ask whether a burger is better than a cheesecake – they
just fall into different domains. Burgers are good for certain reasons while cheesecakes are good
for other reasons. Perhaps we might be able to compare general tastiness levels of one to
another, but it would be mistaken to then try to compare how tasty one burger is to how tasty one
cheesecake is and conclude that burgers are worse than cheesecakes or conclude that burgers are
not better than cheesecakes. In a way, my explanation may be underwhelming for those who
wanted to find a way to make it so that a moral difference turns purely on the distinction between
doing and allowing harm. Rather than attempting to do this, my explanation instead is more of
an explanation why the question of asking whether doing harm is worse than allowing harm is a
somewhat flawed question from the very outset of the discussion.
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It’s also interesting to note that nobody asks whether there is a moral difference between
helping someone and allowing a benefit to befall someone. Of course, the answer is obvious
here, and it would be pretty crazy to think that helping someone could be equivalent to simply
allowing a benefit to happen to someone. Yet, it seems to me that those who argue that there is
no moral difference between doing harm and allowing harm would also be committed to arguing
that there is no moral difference between helping someone and allow benefits to someone, if they
are to truly commit to their conclusion that there really is no difference between doing and
allowing. But my point here is not that the proponents of this view are wrong (because I believe
both sides are misled in the question that they are asking or in the way they answer the question)
but that focusing solely on the metaphysical distinction between doing and allowing as if this
alone makes a difference should also mean that this distinction is important (or irrelevant) in any
context, including doing good and allowing good.24

But though my account of effort points out the flaws in this question of whether doing
harm is worse than allowing harm, I also believe that my account is also superior in explaining
why our intuitions line up in certain ways in doing/allowing harm cases.
In Smith-Jones, Smith’s doing harm was particularly heinous in that it caused the death
of a child. Jones’s omission was of an action that required an absolutely miniscule amount of
effort (pulling a child’s head out of the water) when the victim was in a great amount of need,
and so Jones’s action also seems heinous. Thus, in the Smith and Jones case, doing and allowing
harm seem no different (Figure 3A). In bully and older bystander, the bully’s doing harm was
24

My explanation of why doing good is better than allowing good would be as follows. Allowing good simply
means not exerting effort to do harm, about which morality has nothing to say (unlike with the effort that can be
required to do good) and is thus neutral. Doing good, on the other hand, is positive, with how positive the action is
being modified by effort exerted. (If the good that was done was merely required, then it would also be neutral and
thus equivalent to not doing harm, which seems to align with my intuitions.)

Lee 45
wrong in that he stole his victim’s money. The bystander’s omission was of an action that would
be quite effortful – he would have to confront the bully and take the time to try and reason with
him. Because this action that was omitted was high effort, the omission does not seem very bad.
Thus, in the bully-and-older-bystander case, there does seem to be a difference between doing
and allowing harm (Figure 3B). Furthermore, notice that if the bystander was not just another
older student, but an intimidating adult, the omission would be quite bad. An intimidating adult
would not have to exert much effort at all to stop a bully besides just saying “stop”, so the
omission of the low effort would be comparably bad to (or perhaps even worse than) the bully’s
bullying.
So while other ways of looking at whether doing harm is worse than allowing harm
would have to deal with cases that contradicted their stance either by dismissing them without
explanation or coming up with some other factor, my account can deal with the different
conclusions we come to quite simply. Cases that make allowing harm out to be the same as
doing harm are set up such that the effort that would have been necessary to prevent the harm in
the allowing harm case is quite low. This would make allowing harm impermissible, and
especially blameworthy if the effort was extremely low or the harm being done was quite great
which would make the effort required higher (or both as in the Smith-Jones case). Cases that
make doing harm worse than allowing harm are set up such that the effort that would have been
necessary to prevent the harm in the allowing harm case is not negligible. This would make
allowing harm either permissible or impermissible, but still not as blameworthy as the harm done
in the doing harm case. Thus, my account of effort shows how the way in which effort
modulates the blameworthiness of allowing harm affects our intuitions regarding these sorts of
cases comparing doing and allowing harm.
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A.

B.

Figure 3. Comparisons of doing and allowing in which there appears to be no difference between
doing and allowing like in the Smith-Jones case (A) and in which there does appear to be a
difference like in the bully-older bystander case (B).
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Other Accounts of the Do/Allow Distinction
Hopefully I have now given a plausible account of the broad importance of effort in
morality and in the metaphysical distinction between doing and allowing, as well as the
relevance of effort to the distinction between doing and allowing harm.
In explaining my views on the distinction between doing and allowing harm, I briefly
mentioned Quinn and Bennett as other examples of ways people have looked at the do/allow
distinction. I would now like to take a closer look at such accounts (of which I was admittedly a
bit overly dismissive earlier) while also pointing out what I believe to be a flavor of my account
playing a role in the background of others’ view of doing and allowing.

Let’s reconsider Quinn’s view on doing and allowing. Quinn believes that doing is worse
than allowing because the former involves the violation of negative rights while the latter the
violation of positive rights. And because negative rights take precedence over positive rights, the
violation of negative rights is a more serious offense, making doing harm worse than allowing
harm. The question then, is why should negative rights take precedence over positive rights?
Quinn starts by plausibly claiming that it would not make sense for positive rights to have
precedence of negative rights. If positive rights were more important, then we might get the
absurd result that we should kill, say, two people to one because the positive rights of the one
that tell us to help him can outweigh the negative rights of the two that prevent us from harming
them.
Then Quinn says that negative rights are more serious because if a person’s negative right
can be violated by being harmed to meet the positive rights of others, then the victim does not
own his body in an important moral way – rather, it belongs to the “human community”.
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Furthermore, he states that the extent to which we believe that negative rights are weightier than
positive rights will “depend on how important the relevant forms of legitimate control are to us –
the extent to which we wish to belong… to ourselves.” So Quinn sees this as an issue of what
kind of control the “human community” can have over an individual to meet the needs of others.
I think Quinn’s way of explaining why negative rights are more important than positive ones is
mistaken.
First, he says that negative rights are more weighty than positive rights because of this
issue of control, but positive rights surely also result in a demand on the bodies of others that
they aid someone. So while it seems true that positive rights should not take precedence over
negative rights because of the strange conclusions to which doing so leads, but this issue of
control does not seem like a reason to then place negative rights over positive rights considering
that control is an issue for both positive and negative rights.
But let’s assume that Quinn meant to defend a position where control is less of an issue
with positive rights than it is with negative rights (though he never really does this). Even then, I
think control is not the issue that Quinn makes it out to be, and it seems like control is only a
symptom of what is probably actually more fundamentally important to Quinn. If morality
correctly determines that one person’s sacrifice is necessary to meet the positive rights of
another, then it should also compel that one person to recognize his sacrifice as necessary. That
is not a matter of control. Consider the case in which a person must die so that a highly
populated city is not bombed with a nuclear weapon. I (like many others) would say that it is
acceptable to kill that person. If this is the case, however, I must also accept an implication of
my saying so – if it turned out that I was the one who must die so that a city is not bombed, I
should accept that I can rightfully be killed so that others may live. In accepting this implication,
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I would not feel “owned” by morality or by the human community. I myself recognize that
morality or the human community rightfully demands this sacrifice of me, and the recognition
that this sacrifice is something I ought to do should make me want to give the sacrifice. The only
way in which I would see this as control in the sense Quinn uses it would be if I actually thought
that one person cannot be sacrificed in order to save a city and the human community is in fact
mistaken in believing that I should be sacrificed. In other words, I would feel controlled only if I
believed that the human community is mistaken and demands more from me than can reasonably
be expected. So it is not the control itself I would be objecting to; fundamentally, it is that more
is being demanded of me by the human community than morality actually demands (which
incidentally results in the feeling of being controlled). When Quinn makes rights an issue of
control, he should dig deeper and ask why it is that it feels like one is being controlled instead of
merely objecting to the control itself.
I believe that effort on its own can provide a strong explanation for why negative rights
take precedence over positive ones. To violate a negative right, one not only brings harm upon
someone, but has to put in some effort to do so. On the other hand, to violate a positive right,
one is omitting a helping action or allowing harm; one is not expending a certain amount of
effort to help someone. To ask others to not expend effort to harm me (negative rights) is less
demanding than to ask that they expend effort to help me (positive rights), even if the effort
required by positive rights is a small amount because it is still ultimately easier to not expend
effort than to expend effort. Thus, negative rights take precedence over positive rights.
Now Quinn’s focus on control makes me believe that Quinn, like me, is asking the
question of what can be reasonably demanded of someone to rights because the feeling of being
owned and controlled arises when more is demanded than a right actually does demand. But
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Quinn forgets that rights do not exist in a vacuum. Rights are not some sort of special property
that a human being would have even if there were only a single human being in the universe
(though we often talk about rights as if this were the case). It only makes sense to talk about
rights if there are also people who exist who can respect those rights. This relational nature of
rights makes it such that it is not only the people who have the rights who should be considered
when thinking about rights, but also the other side of the relationship, the people who are being
asked to respect the people with rights. Consequently, control is not only an issue when negative
rights are violated, which was Quinn’s focus, though I certainly believe that the sacrifice that is
forced upon the victim when his negative rights are violated is indeed an important explanation
for the weightiness of negative rights, a sacrifice that is usually not limited to effort (and is thus
not explainable solely by my account of effort). Control is also an issue when we ask others to
respect our rights. My suspicion (or at least hope) is that if Quinn were to then ask the question
of what kinds of things might be demanded in general in order to satisfy rights, both positive and
negative, things like effort would play a similar role for Quinn as it does for me.

Unlike Quinn, Bennett finds that there is no difference between doing and allowing.
Bennett starts off by describing what it means to be positively relevant to an outcome and what it
means to be negatively relevant.25 A person is positively relevant to an outcome if most of the
things that the person could have done would not have resulted in the outcome. A person is
negatively relevant to an outcome if most of the things that the person could have done would
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Bennett uses the terminology of positive/negative instead of doing/allowing or doing/letting in order to talk
specifically about whether a conclusion happens because a person did X or did not do X. This is important for
Bennett because there are cases where a person does some X (i.e. the person is positively relevant to an outcome)
that allows something to happen. Thus it is clearer to talk about positive and negative rather doing/allowing or
doing/letting.
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have resulted in the outcome. He uses two cases of a vehicle rolling down a hill to show what he
means by this26:
A vehicle is rolling down a hill. There is a rock in its path which would stop it.
John kicks away the rock. The vehicle crashes at the bottom of the hill and is
destroyed.
A vehicle is rolling down a hill. There is a rock near its path which would, if
interposed, stop it. John does not interpose the rock. The vehicle crashes at the
bottom of the hill and is destroyed.
In the first scenario, John seems positively relevant to the vehicle being destroyed to us because
most of the actions he could have taken would not have resulted in the vehicle being destroyed.
Only a few ways of moving or types of behavior would result in the removal of the rock from the
path of the car, and John chooses one of those actions that fit into this small category rather than
choosing any of the vast number of other actions he could have taken that would not have
resulted in the removal of the rock. In the second, John seems negatively relevant because most
of the actions he could have taken would have resulted in the vehicle being destroyed. There are
only a small number of kinds of actions or behaviors that would have resulted in John’s
interposing the rock to stop the car, but a huge number of actions that would not. So when John
chooses one of the many ways of acting that do not interpose the rock, John seems negatively
relevant to the outcome of not placing the rock, which is the destruction of the car.
This way of looking can be applied to special cases like the following one that Bennett
constructs:
“Henry is in a sealed room where there is fine metallic dust suspended in the air.
If Henry keeps utterly still for two minutes, some of the dust will settle; and if it
26

Jonathan Bennett, “Morality and Consequences,” Tanner Lectures, (1980) pp. 47–116.
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does, some is bound to fall in such a position as to close a tiny electric circuit
which . , . well, finish the story to suit your taste, but make it something big; and
let’s call its occurrence S. Thus, any movement from Henry, and S will not
obtain; perfect immobility, and we shall get S.”
Bennett’s intuition, which also happens to be mine, is that Henry would be positively
instrumental if he were to keep completely still, which would result in the dust settling and
closing the circuit. For Bennett, this is because the ways that Henry could have acted such that S
obtains (staying perfectly immobile) are fewer than the ways that Henry could have acted such
that S does not obtain (any movement at all). Thus, Henry’s immobility is a doing.
The reason I believe Henry does something in this situation is different. My explanation
is quite similar to my earlier explanation of the hide-and-seek example. Hiding during hide-andseek is not easy – one must stay still and remain hidden. So in order for a person to hide, he
needs to expend effort in order to do so. This effortful behavior, then, should be classified as a
doing, not an omission. Similarly, for Henry to remain immobile would be difficult and
effortful, so when he remains still so that the metal dust can settle, Henry is doing something
rather than omitting something. He is staying still rather than not moving.
But though our intuitions lead us to the same conclusion about whether Henry does
something or does not do something in this case, our different explanations of what it means to
do something and what it means to allow something result in differences in the way we look at
the distinction between doing and allowing. Having defined what being positively relevant and
negatively relevant is, Bennett proposes that there is no moral distinction between being
positively and negatively relevant to an outcome because the fact that there are many ways one
could have acted for a certain outcome to obtain or only a few ways has no moral significance.
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As a result, he finds that there is no important moral distinction between doing and allowing.
Given this difference, it is worth deciding which way of understanding what it means to do
something or to not do something is superior, which I believe can be done with a small
modification to the Henry case:
Henry is in a sealed room where there is a heavy metallic dust suspended in the
air. Because this dust is heavy, it will still settle even if Henry moves a small
amount consistent with how people normally move when they are resting. Such
movement might include things like jiggling of the leg, switching positions,
shifting his weight, and more. If Henry does not move more vigorously than this
for two minutes, some of the dust will settle; and if it does, some is bound to fall
in such a position as to close a tiny electric circuit which . , . well, finish the story
to suit your taste, but make it something big; and let’s call its occurrence S.
In this modified version, Henry does not have to stay immobile. He can still move a small
amount, which means he can simply rest comfortably and the dust will settle. For Bennett,
Henry’s resting would still be a positive action – though this modified version adds to the range
of actions that Henry could take while still having the dust settle, this range is still surely smaller
than the vast range of actions and movements that Henry could still take that would span from
movements that are slightly more active than the movements of a normally resting person to
movements like wild, crazy flailing of his entire body and throwing himself around the room.
The issue for Bennett’s account should now be clear. Given that the relative range of actions that
would result in the dust settling is smaller than the range of actions that would result in the dust
staying suspended in the air, Bennett would have to be committed to saying that Henry’s simply
resting is a positive action, a doing. Even more obviously wrong would be the corollary to this
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commitment, which is that if Henry, being aware that all he has to do is rest and knowing that he
still has the freedom to move to a certain extent, then decides to put extra energy in to make
movements that are more active than those he normally would do while he is resting, he would
be performing a negative action, or an omission. Even flailing his limbs and running around the
sealed room should count as Henry not doing something because it is one of the modes of action
that fall into the majority of actions that do not lead to S. It seems clear that Bennett’s account
leads him to conclusions opposite to what we would expect. My account, on the other hand,
would lead to the conclusions that we would normally expect. If Henry were to simply rest, he
would not be exerting effort in order to do so. So his resting should be seen as an omission. If
he instead exerted effort to move around more actively than he would have had he just rested, he
is exerting effort to do so, so his movement should be seen as an action.
Now although I don’t want to assume too much about what was going on in the
background of Bennett’s intuition, I think that something like effort might be in the background
of his argument. Bennett, though he thinks that the distinction between doing and allowing does
not in and of itself mean anything, seems to have an explanation for why he believes we so often
see a distinction there. When we say that someone does something (or as Bennett would say, is
positively relevant to an outcome), the person is choosing one of the few ways he could have
acted and he “puts his behaviour within a quite small part of the range of all the modes of
conduct which are open to him at the relevant time”. So to do this positively relevant action
would be to “squeeze your behaviour into a designated small area”. In doing so, there is likely to
be some sort of cost associated with forcing oneself to act within this small range of actions. To
allow something to happen, on the other hand, requires only that a person not do something,
which is to act in a way that does not fall into some small category of acting and to instead act in
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one of the many other ways one could act. Because the number of possibilities that are then
available is quite broad, it is more likely that one could act within this range without incurring
some sort of cost. “Compare being banished to Liechtenstein with being banished from
Liechtenstein.” In this way, Bennett addresses objectors who claim that people like Bennett who
see no distinction between doing and allowing are committed to a strenuous commitment like
saying that the bully’s behavior and the older bystander’s behavior is morally equivalent. Rather
than looking at the distinction between doing and allowing, Bennett says, one should consider
other special features like cost that are involved in cases of doing and allowing. For example,
the fact that the older bystander has some type of cost associated with intervening in the bullying
is what distinguishes his behavior from the bully’s behavior, not the fact that the older bystander
allows harm rather than does harm, which is a morally neutral distinction based on the different
numbers of ways of acting that lead to a certain outcome.
Given that Bennett acknowledges how cost and effort plays into being positively and
negatively relevant to an action, it seems to me that his understanding of doing and allowing is
actually somewhat similar to mine – or at least his conclusions might tend to align with mine.
But again, the key difference is that Bennett fails to see that the way we understand doing and
allowing is inherently tied to effort, not to a metaphysical tally of the number of ways one could
act and have some outcome obtain, which I believe the modified Henry case shows. This
inherent connection to effort is what naturally leads us to intuitively consider how effort
magnifies the good or bad of an action and to how effort affects the demand on someone to
perform a low effort helping action. This is an important difference, especially when we
consider cases that are set up such that there seems to be no difference between doing and
allowing. For example, in the Smith-Jones case, there seems to be no difference between Smith
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who drowns the child and Jones who does not save the child from drowning. But the reason why
there appears to be no difference is not because of Bennett’s reason: that whether or not Smith
acted in one of a few modes of acting to drown the child or whether or not Jones acted in one of
the many modes of acting does not matter. Rather, the reason is that Smith and Jones do things
that are similarly wrong, but wrong for different reasons. Smith does something very wrong as
he expends effort to drown a child. Jones does something very wrong because he does not
expend the minimal effort to aid someone in need when he does not save the drowning child. It
just happens to be that Smith and Jones do something similarly wrong, but the reasons why the
two did something wrong are significantly different and important to consider separately. So
even if Bennett happens to get to the same conclusions that I do often enough by considering
cost on top of his account of account of what doing and allowing means, I think there is
sufficient reason to reject both his account of what doing and allowing means and his belief that
cost and effort is somehow a secondary symptom of his account of doing and allowing (which I
believe to be mistaken).

The Intend/Foresee Distinction
Thus far, I have focused mainly on the distinction between doing and allowing harm as
an example of a discussion in which understanding the role of effort in morality can be of help,
mainly because of the way this discussion follows naturally from the question of what we mean
by doing and allowing in the first place. However, I think that effort can also play an important
explanatory role in other discussions as well. As an example, I will now look at the distinction
between intending and foreseeing a consequence, or the doctrine of double effect. The doctrine
of double effect, which Thomas Aquinas is credited with first introducing, notes that an action
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can have two effects, “only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention”.27
An action, then, can have an unintended side effect of a serious harm but still be permissible
given that the intended effect of the action is good and proportional in a way that the harm can be
justified. Another way to put the doctrine is to say that it is wrong to aim at a harm as an end in
itself or as a means to an end; therefore, it is permissible to perform an action if a harm that
follows is merely an unintended or foreseen side effect that results from pursuing a good,
intended effect that follows immediately from the action. This doctrine seems useful in
explaining a series of difficult cases. In the famous “Trolley” case, a trolley is barreling down a
track along which it will kill five people. If diverted onto another sidetrack, it will only kill one
person. Many would say that it is permissible to divert the trolley. In the “Bridge” case, another
trolley is also barreling down towards five people. Above the track is a bridge, where a person is
standing; by pushing this person off of the bridge and onto the track, the trolley will be stopped
and the five people saved. Using the doctrine of double effect, one might say that in “Trolley”,
pulling the lever is not an act intended to kill the one person, but rather a death that is merely
foreseen as a consequence of an act aiming to save the five people. By contrast, in “Bridge”,
pushing the person is an act intending the death of the person, and is thus impermissible despite
the fact that five may be saved. Of course, the distinction is relevant in cases that were not
initially created by philosophers. For example, if a limited amount of resources at a hospital can
only be allocated in a way such that either five people are saved or one is saved, it seems
permissible to choose to save the five (the intended effect) while the one dies (the unintended
side effect). Or consider the difference between terror bombing during wartime and aiming to
kill innocent civilians as a way to demoralize the enemy (seemingly impermissible because it
aims at directly at the deaths of civilians) and tactical bombing of a military target that would
27
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result in the deaths of an equal number of innocent citizens (seemingly permissible because the
deaths are merely foreseen and not intended).

I do not think that the intend/foresee distinction does the moral work that its proponents
claim it does. In defending this position, I will look at the various ways in which we might use
the word “intent”. It seems to me that there are two categories of ways we use this word. First,
“intent” can refer to the mental state of the person performing an action that produces harm.
Second, it can refer to the instrumentality of the harm produced by an action.

One mental state that “intent” can refer to is a broad sense of the word intent – that a
person intends a consequence so long as he was aware of a consequence of his action. The use
of this broad mental sense of the word intention, which I don’t believe many proponents of
double effect in fact defend, seems clearly irrelevant in moral considerations. In this sense of the
word intention, it is hard to see how intending a consequence and foreseeing a consequence can
be different, and thus, how this could affect permissibility. If someone is aware of a
consequence that will occur as a result of the action that he takes, and knowing this consequence,
decides to take that action, clearly this is intention in the broader sense. To knowingly cause a
consequence to occur, whether or not the actor is happy about the consequence or not, and to
claim that that this consequence was somehow not something that the actor chose and intended
in the broader sense is incorrect, and perhaps almost cowardly. In the “Trolley” case, for
example, the two choices are to divert the trolley or to not divert the trolley. We know full well
that diverting the trolley will kill one person. Yet many of us still believe that it is the right thing
to do to divert the trolley, knowing that to do so would be to kill the person. Somehow trying to
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squeeze out of the responsibility of causing the person’s death by saying that it was merely
foreseen and not intended, not a direct consequence of an action that was chosen knowing that it
can be reasonably expected to lead to death, is incorrect and mere wordplay. We know just as
well in “Trolley” as in “Bridge” that we are causing a death – to make a distinction between
foreseeing and intending in the broader sense in these cases merely describes what we wish to be
the case considering our intuition, rather than describing the actual reality. So this sense of the
word “intend” seems irrelevant morally.
Another mental state that “intent” can refer to is in how much a person actually delights
in the harm that will result from an action. In this sense of the word, a person intends a
consequence if he enjoys the fact that the consequence will occur. For example, let’s assume
that it is permissible to bomb a military target despite the fact that civilians will die as well. If
we say that this action is permissible, then it seems that we are committed to say that the action
itself is permissible even if the pilot performing the air raid might take pleasure in the fact that
civilians will die. It seems strange to even think in the first place that the permissibility of an
action can change based on what is going on inside the actor’s head. The pilot’s intention could
not bomb the military target any more, nor could it kill civilians any more (assuming that the
pilot’s delight does not lead him to kill more civilians than those who would die unavoidably) –
the difference in what is inside his head is not manifested in any way in the world. To me, it
seems to be overly abstract and philosophical to say that intention can affect the nature of our
action to the point where we should ignore the real benefits of the action. Scanlon’s way of
addressing this case seems quite insightful here. “Suppose you were prime minister, and the
commander of the air force described to you a planned air raid that would be expected to destroy
a munitions plant and also kill a certain number of civilians, thereby probably undermining
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public support for the war”.28 As prime minister, it would be strange to ask what the intention of
the people flying the mission is and whether it is to destroy the plant while seeing the civilians’
death as a side effect or whether it would be to kill the civilians.

Besides these mental states, it seems that we also say that a person intends harm based on
the structure of the action. In this sense, a person intends a consequence when the consequence
is instrumental to the person’s objective in some way. But this instrumentality sense of the word
seems morally irrelevant to me as well. A person who defends that the narrower sense of the
word “intention” is important morally might say something like this:
In “Trolley”, diverting the trolley, and not the death of the one person, is what is
instrumental for saving the five – if the person could somehow have superhuman
reaction speed (if the case is presented with the person simply standing on the
track and reacting to the diverted trolley) or if the person could escape his ropes
somehow (if it is presented with the person tied to the track), the five would still
be saved. In “Bridge”, however, the person who is pushed needs to be killed, i.e.,
his death is instrumental and intended in the narrower sense. This difference,
then, makes the difference between permissibility and impermissibility.
The situations in which the one person may survive in “Trolley” are presented in order to show
that the person’s death is not directly instrumental to saving the five people. But of course, the
survival would depend on some freak circumstances, so it only seems fair to provide a freak
circumstance for “Bridge” as well. In “Bridge”, what if the trolley hits the person and stops
before hitting the five people, but the pushed person somehow survives in a freak incident
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similar to the stories of people who fall from airplanes and survive? If this happened, clearly the
death of the person is not instrumental to saving the five. Rather, what was necessary was
merely that something stops the trolley. In other words, the death was a foreseen consequence of
the action of pushing something (well, in this case, a person) in front of the trolley to stop it,
rather than an intended one. This mirrors the argument for “Trolley” saying that the death is
merely a foreseen consequence of the action of diverting a trolley onto a track with a person on it
rather than an intended one.
Of course, I am not laying out this example argument for the permissibility of pushing the
person in “Bridge” because I think it is a good argument to demonstrate the permissibility of
pushing the person. Rather, I am laying it out to attempt to show that an argument of this form
can be made for any scenario by focusing down enough onto one aspect of an action such that
the death is no longer instrumental, be it “Trolley” or “Bridge”, and thus that these arguments are
not useful. Such arguments stray away too far from reality. It makes more sense to consider
what can be reasonably expected as a consequence of an action rather than argue about whether
that consequence was actually intended or not. In other words, it is the consideration of to what
extent a consequence is expected or how much risk of harm is acceptable to assume in order to
bring about some good effect that is the factor explaining the differences in the way we feel
about these cases, rather than some shift between intending and foreseeing a consequence.
One might make the point here that if intent is really about risk and certainty of harm as I
am suggesting here, intent should still be relevant morally because risk and certainty of harm are
important morally. But while I agree that risk and certainty of harm are morally relevant, it
would not make sense to take into account risk and certainty of harm as relevant in the cases that
we are talking about here. Once the certainty of harm reaches a certain threshold, small
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differences hardly matter. In other words, though we might say that “Bridge” is a case of
intended harm because the certainty of death is 99.99% which is more than the 99.98% certainty
of death in the foreseen harm of “Trolley”, to claim that this small difference matters seems
absurd. Therefore, intent in the instrumentality sense seems irrelevant morally as well.

So if intention and foreseeing do not affect the permissibility of an action, why does it
seem to matter to us? One reason I believe the doctrine of double effect initially seems to hold
some truth is because of its real or imagined connection to subjective effort. This connection can
be observed when we go through each meaning of the word “intend” and compare someone who
“intends” harm and someone who “foresees” harm.
In the first mental sense in which intent seems to mean something like taking ownership
of a consequence that one knows will follow from his action while foresight seems to mean
something like distancing oneself from the known consequence, we see that a person who
foresees harm is someone who wants to see some distance between the harm and his action, and
therefore has a harder time doing an action if he feels connected to the harm and would
presumably have to use more subjective effort to do harm. I described earlier that that having to
use more subjective effort to do harm is praiseworthy, so this person may feel that intent matters
because of this sort of effect. Of course, to me, such a person ironically seems cowardly because
he falsely tries to distance himself from a harm that he knows will follow from his action.
Regardless, if this person’s false idea that he really could distance himself more from his
“foreseen” harm than another person who intends harm could, this sort of justification using
subjective effort seems to be what is floating around in this person’s ethical subconscious.
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In the second mental sense in which intent means enjoying a harmful consequence and
taking the harm to be an additional motivator to perform an action while foresight means having
an attitude of regret towards the harm, the person who enjoys harm does not have to expend any
subjective effort at all. This, along with the additional enjoyment that this person derives from
the harm makes him as a person more blameworthy regardless of the actual permissibility of his
action. The person who foresees the harm, on the other hand, does not want the harm to occur.
Therefore, such a person would have to expend subjective effort and bring himself to cause this
harm. This additional subjective effort he expends makes him less blameworthy for the harm he
causes than the person who intends harm who spends little to no subjective effort. Unlike the
above mental sense of the word “intent”, this mental sense seems to be one that does in fact
matter morally in the way we look at the person performing an action; it just does not matter in
determining the permissibility of an action.
Lastly, in the instrumentality sense of the word “intent”, a person who intends harm sees
the harm as instrumental in some way to the person’s objective while a person who foresees it
does not. We saw earlier, however, that “intent” here really meant a perceived greater certainty
of harm, so we might also say that the person who intends harm does a harm that is more certain
than a person who foresees it. Assuming that both people spend an equal amount of subjective
effort in order to perform their respective actions, the person who intends harm seems more
blameworthy than the person who foresees harm because the former spends the same amount of
subjective effort to do a more certain harm, implying that he would spend less effort to do a harm
that is less certain like the one the latter causes. If the difference in certainty of harm between
these cases did indeed matter morally, then the proponent of the difference between intending
and foreseeing harm in this sense could hold this plausible position that would give reason for us
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to evaluate the two actors differently based on whether they intended or foresaw harm. But of
course, as I argued above, the certainty of harm between the intending harm case and the
foreseeing harm case seem to cross a threshold point where any small difference between the two
is irrelevant. So any reason to evaluate the intender and the foreseer in this instrumental sense of
the word differently based on subjective effort would be illusory.

Conclusion
I hope that I have been able to shed some light on the importance of effort, a topic which
seems to me too often ignored. Though I do not pretend that effort is the only important moral
factor, I believe that the way in which it plays a role in the way we understand what it means to
do something and what it means to allow something; the way in which subjective effort affects
how we evaluate people’s character; and the way in which objective effort plays a role in
magnifying the goodness or wrongness of an action and the moral impermissibility of allowing
harm are just some examples the widespread relevance of effort. As a demonstration of this
relevance, I have shown two example discussions, the doing/allowing harm distinction and the
doctrine of double effect, in which it seems to me that applying an understanding of the moral
importance of effort can be of great help. Additionally, I also imagine that if we put in the effort,
we would see how this widespread relevance would cause effort to show its face not only in
these examples, but also in other important philosophical discussions, in our day-to-day lives,
and even in TV shows like It’s Always Sunny in Philadelphia.

Lee 65
Bibliography
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica.
Elizabeth Ashford and Tim Mulgan, "Contractualism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Fall 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/contractualism/>.
Roy E. Baumeister, Ellen Bratslavsky, Mark Muraven, and Dianne M. Tice, “Ego Depletion: Is
the Active Self a Limited Resource?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74:5 (1998),
pp. 1252-65.
Jonathan Bennett, “Acting and Refraining,” Analysis, 28 (1967) pp. 30–31.
Jonathan Bennett, “Morality and Consequences,” Tanner Lectures, (1980) pp. 47–116.
Randolph Clarke, Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014).
Frances Howard-Snyder, "Doing vs. Allowing Harm", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/doing-allowing/>.
Rosalind Hursthouse, "Virtue Ethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/ethics-virtue/>.
Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011).
Warren Quinn, “Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing,”
Philosophical Review 98:3 (1989), pp. 287-312.
James Rachels, “Active and Passive Euthanasia,” New England Journal of Medicine, 292 (1975),
pp. 78–86.
T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
T. M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2008).
Edward Slingerland, Trying Not to Try: Ancient China, Modern Science and the Power of
Spontaneity, (New York: Crown, 2014).
Kelly Sorensen, “Effort and Moral Worth,” Ethic Theory Moral Prac 13 (2010), pp. 89-109.
Kelly Sorensen, “The Paradox of Moral Worth,” Journal of Philosophy 9 (2004) pp. 465-483.

